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On the shared-ends account of close friendship, proper care for a friend as an agent 
requires seeing yourself as having important reasons to accommodate and promote the 
friend’s valuable ends for the friend’s own sake. However, that friends share ends doesn’t 
inoculate them against disagreements about how to pursue those ends. This paper defends 
the claim that, in certain circumstances of reasonable disagreement, proper care for a 
friend as a practical and moral agent sometimes requires allowing your friend’s judgment 
to decide what you are to do, even when you disagree with that judgment (and even when 
the judgment is in fact mistaken). In these instances, your friendship can make it the case 
that you may not act on your own practical and even moral judgments because, at those 
times, you have a duty as their close friend to defer to their judgments. As a result, 
treating your friend properly as a responsible agent can require that you assist them in 
committing what may in fact be serious moral wrongs.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Friends do things for one another, and the closer the friendship, the more 
each is willing to do for the other. But how far might this willingness go? Are 
there limits to what close friends, as friends, should be willing to do for one 
another?1  																																																								
 For comments, objections, and discussion, I am grateful to Richard W. Miller, Nicholas Sturgeon, 
Michelle Kosch, Rochelle Duford, Bennett Helm, Lee Franklin, Karen Bennett, Kathleen Wright, 
Melissa Zinkin, Nishi Shah, Robert Dostal, Joel Yurdin, Matthew Schuler, Javier Hildago, Samantha 
Philbrook, Meena Krishnamurthy, and audiences at Cornell University, University of Houston, 
Florida State University, Dartmouth College, Purdue University, Columbia University, Princeton 
University, Virginia Tech, and the Creighton Club, to whom I presented earlier versions of the 
argument contained in this essay. I am especially grateful to Vincent Baltazar, Emily Muller, and 
Sara Streett for our many conversations and arguments about friendship, to Jyl Gentzler and three 
anonymous referees at this journal for the many suggestions that greatly improved the essay, and 
to Nathaniel Jezzi for always thinking that there was something right about the argument even 
when there were many things wrong with it. 
1 By ‘close friendship’ I mean that kind of close voluntary personal relationship between unrelated 
persons that is normally neither sexual nor romantic but is more intimate than, say, “work” or 
“school” friends or any other friendship that depends in large part on proximity for its survival. 
(This is not to deny that genuinely close friendships can have a sexual component. But such a 
sexual component is a complicating factor that does not bear on my discussion here.) Though hard 
to specify with precision, this kind of friendship is what Aristotle takes to be the core kind of 
friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics and what concerns most philosophical treatments of 
friendship, from Montaigne and Kant to, more recently, Laurence Thomas, Marilyn Friedman, 
Dean Cocking, and Jeanette Kennett.  
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Consider the joke: “A friend will help you move house, but a good friend will 
help you move a body.” The view of close friendship implicit here would seem 
to hold that there are very few limits to what friends are willing to do for one 
another, other than those limits that might be generated by the care for the other 
that’s responsible for the willingness in the first place. In particular, this view 
would seem to hold that there are no moral limits to what friends are willing to 
do for one another. Friendship, on this view, has an inherent tendency to lead 
one into “moral danger”: acting properly as a friend, doing for another what 
your friendship calls for, can require that you not act as morality demands.2 
Thus, it would seem that a good friend is one who helps you move a body, even 
when morality forbids it.  
But that cannot be correct. Suppose that you’ve committed premeditated 
murder and you must hide the victim’s body to avoid discovery and arrest. One 
need not have an overly moralized conception of friendship to think that, in this 
sort of case, your good friend may refuse to help you move the body without 
thereby betraying the friendship. Friendship is a relationship of reciprocal care 
and concern—he cares for you, as his friend, as someone who cares about him—
and so if what you’ve asked of your friend is incompatible with proper care for 
him, you two are already outside of the bounds of friendship. Since enlisting him 
as an accomplice to clear and grave wrongdoing—here, covering up a murder—
is incompatible with proper care for him, his friendship with you doesn’t require 
that he allow himself to be thus enlisted. Thus, it would seem instead that a good 
friend is one who helps you move a body, but only when morality allows it.  
But this cannot be correct either. Consider that, on this second view, the joke 
no longer points to what seems a distinctive tension between friendship and 
morality, one that complicates the practice of friendship; instead, it merely 
observes that a good friend, unlike others, is willing for your sake to overcome 
their squeamishness at handling dead bodies.3 As a result, the joke loses much of 
its intuitive force, as it no longer reveals a surprising and uncomfortable truth 
about friendship. But, if neither view is correct, we’re left with the question: 
What exactly is the uncomfortable truth about friendship that the joke reveals? In 
what sense is it true—and interestingly true—that a good friend is one who helps 
you move a body?  
The first thing to observe here is that your friend’s care for you is largely care 
for you as an agent, as someone with her own valuable ends (or projects or aims) 
that he, as your friend, shares.4 To care for a friend as an agent—to share the 																																																								
2 This is the view defended by Dean Cocking and Jeanette Kennett (2000). See Cocking and Kennett 
2000, 279, 292, 296. Their argument about friendship and moral danger is a narrower version of 
Susan Wolf’s (1982) classic argument about the unsuitability of the ‘moral saint’ as a human ideal. 
3 A note on pronoun usage: I have opted at times for the singular “they” when referring to a 
generic person, both because doing so avoids the awkwardness of “he or she” and because it is 
maximally inclusive (since not every person is either a “he” or a “she”). However, when assigning 
genders makes things clearer (for instance, when talking about a situation involving two friends), I 
have done that instead. 
4 This claim concerns what Kyla Ebels-Duggan (2008, 143) calls “the practical element” of love—
that is, those practical reasons that, in virtue of loving a person, you must regard that person as 
giving you. For various accounts of the practical aspect of love (or care), see Ebels-Duggan 2008, 
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friend’s ends—is, in part, to see oneself as having important reasons to 
accommodate and promote the friend’s pursuit of the valuable ends they have 
adopted and to do so for their own sake, for it is then that one cares for the friend 
as someone with an important interest in responsibly exercising their agency in 
their own life.5 Why does your friend’s care for you take this form? It does so 
because it is only then that his care for you is compatible with the general moral 
demand of respect: since he must interact with you, as with anyone, in ways that 
show proper respect for you as an agent, his care for you as his friend must be 
care for you as an agent. Friendship is, in this way, internally structured by 
morality, and so the reasons generated by the fact that his care must be of this 
character—care for you as an agent—are not only reasons of friendship but also 
moral reasons.6  
Putting this sort of care into practice, however, is a complicated endeavor. 
For instance, that a friend shares the other’s end, and so is moved to 
accommodate and promote the other’s pursuit of it, does not inoculate those 
friends against disagreements about how to jointly pursue that end. The 
possibility of such disagreement is inherent in the relationship. And we cannot 
simply say that, when friends confront such disagreements, each should just go 
their own way, doing whatever they each judge right or appropriate, at the cost 
of making joint action in pursuit of the end impossible. Why not? We cannot 
because many such disagreements often do not simply concern what means they 
together should adopt. In the usual cases, the decisions at issue are not merely 
technical ones about how to pursue some already defined end but rather 
decisions that, in being made, both define the end further and help locate it in a 
system of priority with the person’s other ends.7 Thus, decisions about how to 
pursue a friend’s end will often also amount to decisions about the nature and 
relative importance of that end, decisions one might think are appropriately left 
up to the friend, the agent whose end it is.  
My aim in this essay is to refine and defend this thought that the decision 
ought to be left to the friend whose end it is. In certain circumstances of 
disagreement between friends, doing what one judges right or best will count as 																																																																																																																																																							
Cocking and Kennett 1998, Frankfurt 1999, Kolodny 2003, Raz 1989, Scheffler 2001, and Westlund 
2009. 
5 There is a dispute in the literature about the practical reasons close friendship gives rise to: 
Frankfurt (1999) argues that they are reasons to promote the friend’s well-being, while Ebels-
Duggan (2008) argues that they arise out of sharing in your friend’s ends. Though I side with Ebels-
Duggan, I expect that these views are not very far apart, once we understand a person’s well-being 
as including, in large part, the realization of their ends. For discussion, see Ebels-Duggan 2008, 148-
55, 168-70, as well as Raz 1986, 305-13.  
6 This claim that friendship is in this way internally structured by morality is a relatively narrow 
one: affirming it doesn’t require claiming that the partiality that friendship requires can be fully 
reconciled with what morality demands, as that question is largely about reconciling this partiality 
with morality’s demands on you concerning people other than your friend. For two views to the 
contrary, see Scanlon 1998, 164-66, and Herman 2008, 335-36. I thank Nathaniel Jezzi for discussion 
on this point. For related claims about the norms of friendship and morality, see Korsgaard 1992, 
306-7. 
7 As Joseph Raz (1986, 292) notes, “many of any person’s goals [or ends] are nested in his own 
complex goal structures.”  
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failing to share the friend’s end in the right way—as an end that, though shared, 
is still the friend’s—and this failure, as a failure to care for the friend properly as 
an agent, is not just a failure of friendship but also a moral failure. When their 
disagreement satisfies two conditions to be described, the two friends no longer 
confront the question, “What are we (together) to do?”—as this is what they 
disagree about—but rather the different question, “Which of us is to decide what 
we (together) are to do?” And, that they are friends will be relevant to answering 
this latter question: for one of the friends, proper care for the other as an agent 
will require that he defer to her judgment or, in other words, it will require that 
he allow her judgment, rather than his own, to decide what he is to do, even 
when he disagrees with her judgment and even when her judgment is, in fact, 
mistaken. In this kind of disagreement, deferring to her judgment—letting it 
determine how they will pursue her end—is what it takes to care for her as a 
responsible agent.8 And, importantly, this will be true even when the practical 
judgments in question are (or imply) moral judgments, judgments about what 
morality permits or requires. Or so I will argue.9 
In what sense, then, is it interestingly true that a good friend is one who will 
help you move a body? Suppose you want your friend’s help moving a body, but 
he thinks that moving the body is impermissible. Of course, he cares for you and 
wants to help you—friendship pulls him in one direction—but what you want 
help doing is, by his lights, impermissible—and so, morality seems to pull him in 
another. As he sees the situation, there is a tension between the demands of 
friendship and those of morality. But, if his disagreement with you meets the two 
conditions to be described, the appearance that morality pulls in another 
direction will be illusory: his care for you, if it is to be care for you as a 
responsible moral agent, requires that he defer to your judgment that moving the 
body is permissible. And so, a good friend is one who, when facing this sort of 																																																								
8 The argument makes use of a justificatory strategy sketched by Samuel Scheffler (2001). He argues 
that we can justify a person’s special responsibilities by showing that the relationship in question is 
noninstrumentally valuable and that they cannot value this relationship in the right way without 
seeing themselves as having these special responsibilities. My argument here is that a certain kind 
of close friend cannot value their friendship in the right way—as a relationship of mutual care with 
another agent—without seeing themselves as having a duty sometimes to defer to their friend. 
9 That one’s friendship with another can give one a duty to defer to that other is not much 
discussed in the literature on friendship. One notable exception is Philip Soper (2002). Soper’s 
argument, however, casts the situation as one of “competing moral goods”: “We weigh the prima 
facie value of maintaining the relationship against the prima facie dis-value of acting incorrectly 
and discover that sometimes the correct action (in the ultimate sense) requires a compromise of our 
own (correct) views about what to do” (Soper 2002, 19). My claim that the friends’ duty to defer is a 
constitutive duty of friendship is different, for, as a constitutive duty, I can have it even though 
fulfilling it may end the friendship rather than help preserve it. It is a familiar phenomenon that 
sometimes being a good friend requires acting in ways that risk the demise of the friendship. For 
more on constitutive duties and friendship, see Raz 1989, 19 and Raz 1986, 212. Another exception 
may be Marilyn Friedman (1993). In her observation that a friend’s judgments, because they are 
your friend’s, “may provoke [y]our reflection or, even, deference” (Friedman 1993, 191), she does 
not specify whether she means epistemic or what I will call “practical” deference, and I am 
concerned only with the latter sort. Michel de Montaigne (2005 [1580], 10-13) also seems to include 
something like a duty to defer in his discussion of perfect friendship, though whether he does is 
complicated by his insistence that perfect friends do not disagree with each other about what to do. 
(It is a duty, then, that is never activated, at least in perfect friendships.)  
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disagreement with you about moving a body, will defer to your judgment that 
moving the body is permissible, rather than act on their own (conflicting) 
judgment, and so will help you move the body. Their willingness to defer to you 
here does not lead them into moral danger, for they will be morally justified in 
helping you, even if you’re mistaken that moving the body is permissible. 
In the end, the account developed here makes plain one important and 
underappreciated way in which valuable personal relationships make the task of 
abiding by the demands of morality a more complicated endeavor than one 
might have thought. In certain circumstances, the appropriate question 
confronting a person, from the perspective of morality, is not the standard “What 
am I to do here?” but rather “Who is to decide what I am to do here?” And 
sometimes the right answer, from the perspective of morality, is that some other 
person is to decide. The responsible exercise of one’s moral agency sometimes 
requires allowing another to exercise their moral agency in its stead. This claim, 
applied to close friendship, is arguably the surprising and uncomfortable truth 
the joke reveals. 
2. FRIENDSHIP AND DEFERENCE 
The claim I advance here is that friendship, paradigmatically a relationship 
between equals, can give one friend a fairly demanding duty to defer to the 
other. What exactly is this “duty to defer”? Roughly put, to abide by a duty to 
defer to another is to do something not because you judge it to be the 
appropriate, right, or good thing to do in the circumstances, but because the 
other judges it to be so. More precisely, it is to treat that person’s judgment that 
you should do x in some situation as by itself a presumptively conclusive reason 
for you to do x, or, in other words, as a powerful reason to do x that also 
disallows acting on your own judgment of what to do in that situation. By 
deferring to another, you replace in your deliberations your judgment of some 
situation with that other person’s, and you do so not because you think that other 
person’s judgment is correct but rather because it is hers. In this way, the sort of 
deference at issue here is not epistemic deference: this other is not necessarily 
more expert, and you need not think you have reason to believe that her 
judgment is correct or more likely to be so than your own. 10 The deference at 
issue is better described as practical deference: though you may still disagree with 
her, that she makes the sort of practical judgment she does gives you 
presumptively conclusive reason to let her decide what you are to do.11 																																																								
10 There is an extensive literature in epistemology on the significance of disagreement between 
persons. See, for instance, Christensen 2007, Elga 2007, and Kelly 2005. For my purposes, I assume 
that, in the instances of reasonable disagreement at issue, it is rational for each person to make the 
judgment they make, even after recognizing that the other—an epistemic peer—disagrees. I use 
‘epistemic peer’ here somewhat loosely, however, for, in the cases at issue here, neither knows 
whether the other is an epistemic equal.  
11 Those familiar with Joseph Raz’s account of practical authority will notice that, when you have a 
duty to defer to a person’s judgment in the sense at issue here, that person’s judgment will be, on 
Raz’s account, practically authoritative for you. It might be objected that, since authority relations 
	 6 
Why think that friendship is partly constituted by a duty sometimes to defer 
to the other’s judgments? Kyla Ebels-Duggan (2008) has recently defended “the 
shared ends view” of the practical aspect of love. On her account, loving another 
“as a full-fledged agent… well-functioning enough to have sovereignty over 
[her] own life” directs you to share in her ends, to do things with her in pursuit 
of those ends (Ebels-Duggan 2008, 147, 156). Sharing another’s ends, she claims, 
requires that you regard this other as having a distinctive kind of practical 
authority over you, what she calls “selection authority”: “by choosing from 
among the set of permissible projects, [the other] gives you reason to pursue 
those chosen ends with her rather than concentrate your efforts on some other 
worthwhile pursuits” (ibid., 156).12 It is the reciprocal recognition of this selection 
authority that partly enables friends to pursue shared ends in a way that 
preserves each friend’s status as an agent with ends that, though shared by the 
other, are still their own. 
Treating a friend as an agent with ends that, though shared, are still her own 
doesn’t only require that you regard her selection of those ends as authoritative, 
however. It also matters how you pursue those ends with her. As Ebels-Duggan 
notes, for many of a person’s ends, what matters is not simply that something be 
done but also that she herself is the one who does it. These ends are what Joseph 
Raz calls “agency goals,” that is, ends “that others can help [the person] reach, by 
providing the right environment, the right conditions. But they cannot reach 
[these ends] for him” (Raz 1986, 306). Consider Ebels-Duggan’s example: 
Suppose that your brother aims to write a novel. … His choice to pursue 
the end… gives you very different reasons than it gives him. It gives him 
reason to form a plot, develop characters, and set aside time for 
concentrated writing. You should regard yourself as having reasons to 
accommodate and promote his doing these things. For instance, you 
should respect his aim to spend afternoons writing by not dropping by 
for unannounced visits. If you share his end fully, you also take it to give 
you reason to take positive measures. You might, for example, read and 																																																																																																																																																							
are incompatible with friendship as a relationship of equals, a friend cannot have a duty of 
friendship to defer to the other. However, to say that one friend’s judgment can be authoritative for 
the other is not yet to say that this other is subject to their authority in any troubling sense. It’s not 
the claim, for instance, that this other stands in a nonreciprocal relationship of regular deference to 
the friend’s directives, deference that the friend is entitled to demand. Rather, the claim here is that 
each friend sometimes must defer to the other; thus, they don’t stand in the sort of authority 
relations toward one another that would be incompatible with friendship as a relationship of 
equals. For Raz’s account, see Raz 1986, chaps. 2-4. For a related account, see Shapiro 2002. And, in 
fact, Abraham Sesshu Roth (2004, 2013) has recently proposed that the best way to understand the 
origins of the “distinctive interlocking structure of intentions” (Roth 2013, 1) involved in shared 
activity as such is that one participant exercises a kind of authority over the matter at hand, and so 
over the other participant(s), by issuing an intention that the other participants act on directly. Roth 
also thinks that this kind of authority is compatible with the equality characteristic of friendship in 
that, while one friend may have it in some situations, the other will have it in some other situations. 
I thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing Roth’s work to my attention. 
12 Christine Korsgaard (1992, 307) makes a similar point in her discussion of Kant: “While love 
moves you to pursue the end of another, respect reminds you that she must determine what those 
ends are.”  
	 7 
comment on his drafts. The point… is that sharing in this end doesn’t 
require you to adopt the same project that he does: you don’t aim to write 
the novel. Rather, it requires you to accommodate and promote his end, 
that is, his writing of the novel. (Ebels-Duggan 2008, 156-57) 
When it comes to a friend’s agency goal, then, you cannot properly share it by 
appropriating it as something you may do for her because such appropriation 
misunderstands her end. Your sharing of it must be done in a way that 
acknowledges it as hers in a more robust sense—she has an interest in exercising 
her agency in direct pursuit of the end that you do not—and you share it in that 
way by taking yourself to have reason to assist her in her pursuit of it. 
Treating these shared ends as hers in this more robust sense, however, 
requires that you recognize your friend as having another kind of authority, one 
that Ebels-Duggan’s account overlooks. To see this, consider first her remarks 
about the limits of a friend’s selection authority:  
Now imagine that your partner proposes to undertake an end that you 
regard as flatly impermissible… Here we run up against a limit on the 
beloved’s authority: the provisional adoption of an impermissible end 
simply can’t generate reasons for you. You may still owe it to your 
beloved to consider her view that it would not be impermissible to 
undertake the project in question, if indeed this is her view. But, in the 
end, you will have to rely on your own considered judgment about this. 
(Ebels-Duggan 2008, 162) 
On Ebels-Duggan’s view, your friend’s selection authority runs out when she 
selects an end that you find morally impermissible; that she judges it permissible 
doesn’t itself give you reason to share that end with her.13  
Now, suppose instead that while you agree that the end itself is permissible, 
you think that, under the circumstances, it is impermissible to pursue that end 
altogether or at least in the way your friend proposes. A natural extension of 
Ebels-Duggan’s claim above would be to say, about these cases, that your friend 
has no authority over the manner of your joint pursuit of her ends that overrides 
your moral judgments about the manner of their pursuit. On this view, you may, 
consistent with the demands of friendship, act on your own moral judgments—
and so refuse to do what you judge impermissible—even when doing so means 
declining to help your friend pursue some end, one that you otherwise share, in 
the way that she judges appropriate. 
However, as I will argue in the following sections, there is one important 
class of disagreements over how to pursue a shared end about which this view is 
mistaken: when it comes to these disagreements, you may not, consistent with 
treating your friend as a full-fledged agent with sovereignty over her own life, 
act on your own considered judgment about how to pursue the end. For these, 
then, the question of authority (and so deference) does arise. These are 
disagreements, including moral ones, that meet two important conditions: 																																																								
13 For a similar claim about such cases, see Westlund 2009, 3.  
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1. Particular agency interest (PAI): The two friends disagree about what 
they together are to do, but one friend has a particular interest in 
exercising their agency with regard to this question—the end(s) at stake 
or implicated here is (are), in the first place, their end(s)—while the other 
friend does not. 
2. Reasonable judgment (RJ): The friends’ disagreement about what they 
together are to do in pursuit of the shared end cannot be explained, 
wholly or in part, by appeal to flaws in the deliberations of the friend 
who has the particular agency interest here. 
When the friend has a particular agency interest in the matter at hand (and you 
do not) and her judgment of the matter is reasonable, sharing her end in the right 
way requires deferring to her judgment about how jointly to pursue that end. 
And this requirement for sharing her end holds even when the disagreement is a 
moral one: so long as her judgment that it is permissible to pursue the end the 
way she wants is a reasonable one, you must defer to it; otherwise, you fail to 
care for her as a full-fledged agent with sovereignty over her own life. Such a 
failure is not simply a failure of friendship but also a moral failure.14 
2.1 Deference as a Duty: A Case 
The main claim about the friend’s duty to defer concerns the other’s 
reasonable moral judgments. But, before defending that claim, we must first 
establish that close friendship gives rise to a duty to defer at all, since some 
might doubt that such a duty is ever a feature of everyday interpersonal 
interactions that are outside of institutionalized authority relationships. To 
address this initial doubt, consider the following case, one that doesn’t involve 
close friends but only acquaintances: 
Promised Help: One weekend, Subrena’s acquaintance Neelam calls her. 
Neelam is auditioning that week for the role of Blanche DuBois in a 
production of A Streetcar Named Desire, a role that could be her big break. 
Earlier that week, Subrena had run into Neelam. During their 
conversation then about Neelam’s upcoming audition and her hopes for a 
career in the theater, Neelam had expressed her worry that, because most 
of her friends were also auditioning for parts, no one would be able to 
give her any last minute help preparing for the audition: “I hope I’ll be 
ready by then because I don’t think anyone will be around.” Responding 
to Neelam’s concern, Subrena had promised her that she would help her 
rehearse her lines this weekend if she needed it. Now it’s the weekend. 
Neelam says, “I know you’d probably rather do something else with your 
weekend than help me rehearse, but my friends are all busy preparing for 																																																								
14 The deference at issue here is thus quite far from the sort of thoroughgoing deference that 
Thomas Hill (1991) made famous in his discussion of “the Deferential Wife.” For an illuminating 
account of why this sort of thoroughgoing (or, “self-abnegating”) deference is a pathology of 
agency, see Westlund 2003. 
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their auditions. I really need your help.” It seems to Subrena, however, 
from other things Neelam had said, that Neelam does not really need her 
help—she’s been preparing for weeks and she has both the lines and the 
character down cold—and Subrena can imagine that, were she to help 
her, the extra practice would be counterproductive by making Neelam 
overprepared. Still, Neelam thinks that she needs Subrena and that 
Subrena, because of her promise, should help her. 
In this case, it’s clear that Subrena ought to help Neelam rehearse her lines, even 
though she thinks that Neelam doesn’t need her help, because she promised that 
she would. Indeed, one might think, that’s just what promises do: they commit 
the promisor to certain courses of action. But that’s not quite what Subrena’s 
promise has done. Strictly speaking, it doesn’t commit Subrena to helping 
Neelam; rather, it commits Subrena to acting on Neelam’s judgment of whether 
she needs her help. If Neelam decides that she needs Subrena’s help, Subrena 
must help her whether or not she agrees with that judgment; and, if Neelam 
decides that she doesn’t need it, and so Subrena doesn’t help her, Subrena can 
still count as having kept her promise so long as she stood ready to help. Thus, 
the duty Subrena has created is a duty to defer to Neelam’s judgment about 
whether she is to help her. 
Indeed, it is in virtue of creating this duty to defer that Subrena’s promise is 
valuable for Neelam, for it gives her sufficient grounds to rely on Subrena’s 
availability as an option when deciding how to prepare for her auditions. 
Because Subrena has done more than simply state an intention to help Neelam 
should she need it, or, more precisely, an intention to help her should Subrena 
judge that she needs it, Neelam can count on Subrena’s availability to help her. 
In this way, this promise is valuable even if Neelam decides that she does not 
need help after all, since what matters is that, by ensuring that Neelam has this 
option, Subrena takes steps to ensure that it is up to Neelam whether someone 
helps her rehearse.15 Subrena makes it the case that, in this small way, how 
Neelam prepares for her audition is determined by her own judgments rather 
than determined for her by circumstances or by others (as it would have been 
had she judged that she needed help but could find no one to help her). By 
making such a promise and thus creating a duty to defer, Subrena shares 
Neelam’s end—in a narrow, one-off way appropriate for acquaintances—and she 
does so in a way that recognizes Neelam’s end as an agency goal.16  																																																								
15 And so, we see why Subrena’s promise that she’ll help Neelam if Neelam decides that she needs 
it is not just a long-winded way of promising Neelam that she’ll help her. With the former promise, 
Subrena explicitly leaves it up to Neelam to decide whether she will help her. With the latter 
promise, Subrena would make helping Neelam the presumptive course of action; and, while 
Neelam can annul this presumption by releasing Subrena from the promise, it will in normal 
circumstances steer Neelam toward using Subrena’s help, and this steering effect isn’t fully 
compatible with leaving the decision up to her. I thank Jyl Gentzler for discussion on this point. 
16 This discussion of Subrena’s promise, despite being a promise between acquaintances, is inspired 
by Seana Shiffrin’s account of promises between intimates: “Promising to ϕ conveys [to A, the 
promisee] B’s willingness to forswear the moral right to alter course. B's participation is no longer 
dependent on how B perceives the merits of the activity at the time of action. The promise 
acknowledges A's investment in the situation in a way that includes A rather than making A a 
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2.2 Deference as a Duty of Friendship: A Case  
We have seen that certain acts, such as making a promise, can commit a 
person to deferring to another’s judgment. But it is also the case that friendship 
can give rise to a duty to defer. Consider the following case. Here, two friends 
face a disagreement about what they together will do, a disagreement that, 
because it concerns only the friends’ interests, is confined to the friendship: 
Friend’s Audition: On the same weekend as Promised Help, Rosa’s good 
friend Clara calls her. Clara, like Neelam, is auditioning that week for the 
role of Blanche DuBois, and this role may prove her big break. As her 
good friend, Rosa is well aware of Clara’s ambitions in the theater, and 
she respects her talent and potential very much. Clara says, “I know 
you’d probably rather do something else with your weekend than help 
me rehearse, but my other friends are all busy preparing for their 
auditions. I really need your help.” Rosa doesn’t have any plans for the 
weekend (and Clara knows this); but she also finds helping others 
rehearse their lines somewhat tedious and dull. And it seems to Rosa 
from their previous conversations that Clara doesn’t really need her—
she’s been preparing for weeks, and she has both the lines and the 
character down cold—and Rosa can imagine that, were she to help her, 
the extra practice would be counterproductive by making Clara 
overprepared. Still, Clara thinks that she needs Rosa and that Rosa, as her 
friend, should help her. 
Clara and Rosa disagree about whether Clara needs Rosa’s help. But Rosa, unlike 
Subrena in Promised Help, is not bound by any prior promise to help Clara 
should Clara decide that she needs it; she is bound, instead, by their friendship to 
share Clara’s ends. And it is clear here that Rosa, as her friend, ought to help 
Clara rehearse her lines. But what explains this? It seems to me that Rosa has a 
duty here to defer to Clara’s judgment about what the joint pursuit of her end 
requires here—it requires that Rosa help Clara rehearse—rather than act on her 
own judgment of what that pursuit requires—that she decline to help. 
Clara’s judgment that Rosa should help her is a reasonable one. And Clara 
has a particular interest in exercising her agency here—it is her success in the 
audition that’s at stake—while Rosa does not. Rosa must take Clara’s judgment 
seriously as a judgment about how to pursue her end, and taking it seriously as a 
judgment requires that, in Rosa’s deliberations about whether to help Clara 
rehearse her lines, she replaces her judgment of whether Clara needs her help 
with Clara’s judgment. It is by doing this that Rosa responds appropriately to 
Clara’s interest in exercising her agency, for it is Clara’s judgment that Rosa 
makes effective by helping her rehearse her lines. Rosa, of course, will still 
ultimately act on her own judgment: she judges that she ought to help Clara. But 																																																																																																																																																							
bystander to what unfolds. … The promise to A does not just increase the likelihood of B's 
performance… but actively affirms A's status as a free person, capable and worthy of exercising 
sound judgment about what is to be done” (Shiffrin 2008, 507-8). For related discussion, see Fried 
1981, 13-14. 
	 11 
this judgment, if it is to express proper respect for Clara as a responsible agent, is 
of a particular sort: “This is Clara’s decision to make, and her judgment that she 
needs me is reasonable. As her friend, I ought to defer to her about this.” Thus, 
Rosa shares Clara’s end in the right way, as an end that is still, in the relevant 
ways, Clara’s own. 
Some might doubt that deference is needed to explain why Rosa ought to 
help Clara. After all, one might think, when helping is not burdensome, a friend 
simply has reason to go along with the other’s wishes. In Friend’s Audition, 
Clara is not asking much of Rosa and were Rosa to refuse her help, not only 
would Clara be disappointed—she would have no one to help her—but her 
disappointment, directed at Rosa, would likely damage their friendship. Rosa 
ought to help her, but not because Rosa ought to defer to Clara’s judgment; 
rather, she should simply go along with it so as to please Clara. On this proposal, 
then, what friendship requires is merely that Rosa humor Clara.17  
Admittedly, humoring a friend—going along with her judgment—is 
sometimes appropriate, but it is as a sort of triage, as a way of minimizing any 
damage the disagreement might cause. As triage, however, it seems appropriate 
only when the friend is being unreasonable—her reasoning is clearly mistaken 
but, for whatever reason, she cannot be made to see the mistake—for the aim of 
humoring her is simply to get through the situation and on to other things. But 
this is not the case in Friend’s Audition: though Clara may be mistaken, her 
judgment is far from unreasonable. Humoring Clara, treating her judgment as 
unreasonable but not worth correcting, would thus betray an attitude of 
condescension incompatible with proper respect for Clara and her capacity for 
responsible agency.18 This proposal, then, fails to explain why Rosa ought to help 
Clara. 
Another proposal would be to say that though Rosa is indeed right to help 
Clara, it is not because she must defer to Clara’s judgment but rather because 
Clara’s interest in exercising choice outweighs her other interests here and so 
allowing Clara’s choice to be effective is how Rosa best promotes Clara’s good. 
Clara, of course, wants to give the best audition she can, since this end is an 
important part of her more comprehensive end of a successful theater career. But, 
this proposal notes, this end of a successful audition is an agency goal: it is not 
only important that Clara’s audition goes well but that she herself brings it about 
that it goes well; and, since one of the ways that she brings it about herself is by 
deciding how to prepare for it, she has important reasons to exercise choice in 																																																								
17 On Soper’s account, this explanation is one way to justify deferring to another’s judgment: when 
deciding whether to go along with a friend’s judgment, “I must take into account not only my 
partner’s disappointment if I do not [go along with her judgment], but also the potential impact on 
the relationship” (Soper 2002, 25). Though Soper calls this sort of “going along” deference, it does 
not count as deference on my use of the term; it can merely look like deference. 
18 Even in those cases when one friend is right to humor the other in this way, she normally 
shouldn’t admit to the other that she is merely humoring him: because the other thinks 
(mistakenly) that his judgment is reasonable, such an admission would be seen by him 
(mistakenly) as expressing an attitude of condescension. It is really only later, once the other has 
realized that his judgment was unreasonable, that it will be appropriate for the friend to admit that 
she had merely humored him. 
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Friend’s Audition.  
On this proposal, then, Rosa ought to help Clara rehearse because doing so is 
the way, in this situation, for Rosa to be appropriately responsive to Clara’s 
interest in exercising choice: by helping her, she allows her choice of how to 
prepare for her audition to be effective. Admitting in this way that Clara has an 
interest in exercising choice separate from those interests promoted by choosing 
well—and that Rosa ought to promote this interest, possibly at the expense of the 
others—does not, however, get a duty to defer, since this interest, as one of 
several, simply gets included with the others in Rosa’s deliberations about 
whether Clara needs her help. This proposal, then, is a particular challenge 
because, on its account, Rosa’s decision to help Clara, though not a decision to 
defer to Clara’s judgment, nevertheless seems to take Clara seriously as a fellow 
agent: Rosa’s task, as Clara’s friend concerned to promote her good, is to weigh 
Clara’s conflicting interests correctly, and sometimes, as in Friend’s Audition, her 
interest in exercising choice wins out over the others.  
The problem with this proposal, however, is that, by treating Clara’s interest 
in exercising choice as just another interest among several, Rosa’s deliberations 
about whether to help Clara betray a (more subtle) attitude of condescension 
toward Clara and her capacity for responsible agency. Consider Clara’s 
judgment that she needs Rosa’s help. This is a judgment about what, in this 
situation, would best promote those various interests at stake in her pursuit of a 
successful audition. But now consider Rosa’s deliberations according to this 
proposal. She must judge what, in this situation, would best promote those 
various interests that are at stake for Clara, but now Rosa must add Clara’s 
interest in exercising choice into the mix, and this latter interest competes with 
these others. Which interests win out, however, depends on how Rosa’s 
deliberations go, on the weights she assigns to these other interests in light of her 
understanding of the situation and of Clara, her ends, and so forth. On this 
proposal, then, whether or not Rosa allows Clara’s judgment to be effective 
depends on Rosa’s own judgment of Clara’s interests.  
But Clara’s judgment that she needs Rosa’s help rehearsing her lines 
concerned just those other interests and their comparative weights in the 
situation. Rosa’s deliberations, insofar as they use Rosa’s judgment of those 
interests, do not take Clara’s judgment seriously as a judgment, as a prospective 
exercise of her agency in the pursuit of her end. Even though the end at issue is 
Clara’s audition, Rosa’s deliberations presume that when it comes to deciding 
what she (Rosa) is to do, the relevant judgment is not Clara’s (reasonable) 
judgment that she needs Rosa’s help; rather, it is Rosa’s judgment that she does 
not combined with her judgment that, even so, Clara’s interest in exercising 
choice outweighs those interests promoted by a successful audition. And so, 
even were Rosa to decide to help Clara rehearse her lines, she would not be 
acting on Clara’s claim that she needs her help as Clara’s judgment of her own 
interests but rather acting on it merely as a need Clara has to feel in control of the 
situation that, on Rosa’s judgment, happens to outweigh those interests. Because 
it fails to take seriously Clara’s judgment as a judgment, Rosa’s deliberations fail 
to take Clara seriously here as a responsible agent pursuing her own ends and, in 
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that way, they betray an attitude of condescension incompatible with proper 
respect for Clara and her capacity for responsible agency. Thus, this second 
proposal also fails to explain why Rosa ought to help Clara. 
2.3 Deference as a Duty of Friendship: Two Objections  
The result thus far is that, at least when it comes to certain disagreements 
about what to do that are confined to a friendship, friendship gives rise to a duty 
to defer. Before moving on to consider cases of moral disagreements that are not 
wholly confined to the friendship (for example, disagreements about whether to 
move a body), we need to consider two objections to this preliminary result.  
The first objection is that a duty of friendship to defer to another, unlike a 
duty to defer generated by a promise, is incompatible with the duty-bearer’s 
status as a responsible agent with her own valuable ends; and, since a person 
cannot be required to relinquish this status, friendship cannot include a duty to 
defer. On the account I’ve offered here, Subrena, in Promised Help, and Rosa, in 
Friend’s Audition, each lack the full prerogative to deliberate and decide for 
themselves how they are to act. However, as this objection notes, Subrena lacks 
that prerogative because she has freely surrendered it; and, because it was up to 
her to surrender it (or not), she could still take her own ends seriously, making 
the promise only if she thought doing so were compatible with pursuing those 
ends. But, if Rosa has a duty to defer, it is one that she simply finds herself with, 
and so she simply finds herself deprived of that prerogative in favor of her friend 
and her friend’s ends; this is objectionable from the perspective of Rosa’s own 
status as a responsible agent, as she is unable, in her own deliberations, to take 
the pursuit of her own ends seriously.19  
It is true, of course, that finding yourself without the full prerogative to 
deliberate for yourself is often a significant loss of control, as you are unable to 
tailor your actions to suit your ends; possessing this prerogative thus has 
instrumental value. It will often also have representative value for you: 
exercising this sort of control allows you to affirm your status as a responsible 
agent.20 But whether such control is valuable in these ways depends on the 
circumstances, and, in Friend’s Audition, it is not. Persons can be friends with 
others—and so possess a duty in certain situations to defer to them—without the 
possession of that duty impairing their ability as responsible agents to take their 
own ends seriously. 
Consider the context. Rosa cares deeply for Clara as an agent: she is 																																																								
19 This objection is a version, applied to this argument about deference in friendship, of a long-
standing objection to proposed nonvoluntarist accounts of political authority and obligation. For 
one recent and sophisticated marshaling of this “voluntarist” objection, see A. John Simmons’s 
work, particularly Simmons 1979 and 2001. I thank Jyl Gentzler for discussion of this objection. 
20 As T. M. Scanlon explains, the exercise of choice (or, as I put it here, the prerogative to deliberate 
and decide for oneself) has representative value when we have “reasons… for wanting to see 
features of ourselves manifested in actions” (Scanlon 1998, 252). For related discussion, see 
Elizabeth Anderson’s discussion of gift exchange in Anderson 1993, 151-52. 
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intimately aware of, sensitive to, and regularly moved to promote Clara’s 
interests, including her interest in exercising her agency in the pursuit of her own 
ends. And, importantly, Clara reciprocates this care. Furthermore, Rosa trusts in 
Clara’s care for her as an agent. As Karen Jones’s account of trust has it, Rosa 
possesses “an attitude of optimism” about Clara’s care for her as well as “the 
confident expectation” that, in the appropriate circumstances, Clara will be 
moved by this care (Jones 1996, 5-6).21 And, importantly, Clara reciprocates that 
trust. As a result, Rosa’s deference has particular significance as expressing both 
her trust in and care for Clara. It expresses Rosa’s trust in Clara in that, by 
deferring to Clara’s judgment, Rosa hands her agency over to Clara (in a limited 
way) for her to do with what she thinks best; and Rosa’s willingness to do so 
shows Clara that she trusts that Clara made this judgment thinking, not only of 
herself, but also of Rosa.22 It also expresses Rosa’s care for Clara by satisfying an 
important interest Clara has as an agent—here, to have how she prepares for her 
audition depend on her own judgments—an interest to which Rosa ought to be 
specially responsive simply because it is Clara’s.23  
Rosa’s care for, and trust in, Clara—and so Rosa’s willingness to defer to 
Clara—are justified, in part, because Clara is willing to defer in similar situations 
to Rosa, and such willingness expresses Clara’s care for, and trust in, Rosa. Were 
Clara unwilling to reciprocate this deference in those situations, Rosa would 
have reason to doubt both that Clara trusts her and that Clara cares for her in the 
right way, as an agent with her own valuable ends.24 And these doubts would 
rightly call into question the appropriateness of her deferring to Clara. Thus, 
Rosa must give Clara’s interest in exercising agency in the pursuit of her ends 
this special importance in her deliberations—she must share Clara’s ends in this 
way—only because Clara gives Rosa’s interests, including her interest in 
exercising agency, a similar importance in her own deliberations.25  
Deferring to Clara, then, is compatible with Rosa’s status as a responsible 
agent because Rosa’s deference is to someone who cares about her as an agent 
with her own valuable ends: the instrumental value that Rosa’s deliberative 
prerogative has in protecting and promoting her interests is provided here by the 
character of their relationship. And so, were Rosa to refuse to defer to Clara, she 
would be holding herself back from Clara as a way to guard her ability to take 																																																								
21 As Jones (1996, 7) says, “When we trust a friend, the competence we expect them to display is a 
kind of moral competence. We expect a friend to understand loyalty, kindness, and generosity, and 
what they call for in various situations.” 
22 Of course, Rosa may not be aware either that, by deferring to Clara, she is expressing her trust in 
Clara or that she is willing to defer to her, in part, because she trusts Clara and Clara’s good will. 
Annette Baier notes that this sort of trust is normally unself-conscious. As she says, “The ultimate 
point of what we are doing when we trust may be the last thing we come to realize” (Baier 1986, 
236). 
23 In this case, it is not only important that Clara be helped in this way but also that Rosa be the one 
to help her. For discussion of this feature of care for another, see Blustein 1991, 146, 150. 
24 Laurence Thomas (1987, 225) notes that a failure of friends to reciprocate indicates a lack of trust 
between them. 
25 To be clear, the argument here is about what justifies Rosa’s willingness to defer to Clara when 
circumstances warrant it and not about what properly motivates Rosa, as Clara’s friend, to defer to 
Clara in those circumstances.   
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her own ends seriously; but, because doing so is unnecessary in the context of the 
mutual care and trust between them, it is incompatible with proper care for Clara 
as an agent.26 Their relationship thus makes it possible for Rosa and Clara to care 
for one another as responsible agents worthy of determining the course of their 
own lives—they can share the other’s ends still very much as the other’s—without 
thereby endangering their ability, as responsible agents, to take their own ends 
seriously.27 And, partly because of this, their friendship itself counts as an 
ongoing joint achievement that they each have reason to value. But to value it 
properly just is to possess the commitment to doing what the friendship requires; 
and so, when Rosa defers to Clara, she expresses a commitment to the friendship 
that is genuinely her own: it is one of her valuable ends. In this way, Rosa’s 
deference in Friend’s Audition properly counts not as a betrayal of her status as a 
responsible agent but rather as an expression of it.  
The second objection targets the claim that Rosa’s duty to defer, like 
Subrena’s, is a moral duty. According to this objection, what’s been argued for 
thus far—that Rosa, if she is to care for Clara as a friend, ought to defer to her—
doesn’t yet show that the ‘ought’ here is a moral one, since Rosa isn’t morally 
required to care for Clara as a friend. (Friendships are morally optional 
relationships.) Thus, the most the argument shows, according to this objection, is 
that Rosa has merely a duty of friendship to defer to Clara, not that Rosa’s duty, 
like Subrena’s, is also a moral duty.28  
 Friendships are, as the objection notes, morally optional relationships: 
persons are free both to form (or, more commonly, to decline to form) 
friendships with others and to dissolve those friendships they’re currently in.29 
The objector takes this admission to be crucial for understanding the status of the 
duties generated by a friendship: “Aren’t my duties,” she wonders, “then 																																																								
26 Jeffrey Blustein (1991, 57) makes the related point that “[l]etting go of attempts to control partly 
characterizes the relationship of friends.” In this way, my argument represents, to some extent, an 
addition to David Velleman’s (1999) account of love. Velleman argues that love is “an arresting 
awareness” of the beloved’s value, specifically an awareness that arrests “our tendencies toward 
emotional self-protection from another person, tendencies to draw ourselves in and close ourselves 
off from being affected by him” (Velleman 1999, 360-61). If my argument here is correct, love for a 
close friend arrests not only our tendencies to emotional self-protection but—insofar as it is love for 
the friend as an agent—also our tendencies toward what might be called practical or deliberative 
self-protection. 
27 This is not entirely true, for, even if your friend is motivated by the right reasons, her judgment 
may still be mistaken. (Friend’s Audition is an example.) This risk of mistakes, however, simply 
comes along with friendship (or any such relationship) if it is to be a relationship in which each 
friend’s interest in exercising agency is respected. And this sort of risk is the same as the risk a 
person assumes when they insist that their own interest in exercising agency be respected, for they 
may make mistakes that, had another chosen for them, could have been avoided. 
28 I thank Bennett Helm and Lee Franklin for discussion of this objection. 
29 Though friendships can be entered into by (a more or less explicit) agreement—and so 
friendships can be based on consent—I think it more common for a person, after a period of doing 
friend-type things with another, to discover that they have become friends with that other, say, by 
finding themselves in a situation in which they need this other or vice versa. In these cases, 
although the friendship is not based on consent (or even entered into intentionally), it is a 
voluntary relationship, for they were free to refrain from doing with this other those friend-type 
things that standardly lead to friendship. 
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contingent on my caring for my friend, thus making them hypothetical 
imperatives—‘If I care for him as a friend, I ought to do x’—and so not yet moral 
duties?” The objector’s mistake here, however, lies in confusing the claim that 
her duties are contingent on the friendship with the claim that they are 
contingent on her caring for him as a friend. Notice that the care at issue here is 
attitudinal care—the feelings of care for the other—and the objector is right to 
take this sort of care to be partly constitutive of friendship.30 Indeed, in a 
properly functioning friendship, these feelings of care are what motivate the 
actions of care: I act out of care for my friend, willingly (and even 
enthusiastically) fulfilling my duties of friendship toward him. However, I 
recognize at the same time that the force of my duties doesn’t depend on 
whether, when they lay claim to my actions, I actually have those feelings of care 
or, if I fail to have them, on whether I am confident that this failure is only a 
temporary aberration; instead, it is the fact of our relationship—and, in 
particular, of our mutual commitments to care for one another as friends—that 
both grounds my duties of care for him and justifies my feelings of care for him.31 
If I’m having a bad day, or if I’m rather grumpy, or if I’m just feeling a powerful 
sense of alienation from him—he strikes me at that moment as very much a 
stranger—and thus I fail to have the appropriate feelings of care, my duties of 
friendship nevertheless remain in force. And, if this failure to have these feelings 
proves persistent and stable such that I no longer count as caring for him as a 
friend, my duties of friendship remain in force until I make this failure public 
within our friendship, for it is only then that our relationship—and, in particular, 
the practical commitments to one another partly constitutive of it—is open to 
revision or even dissolution.32 Indeed, it would be difficult to explain the ways in 
which friends are able to rely on one another in the pursuit of shared ends were 
we to take these duties to be contingent in the way that the objection requires. 
If it is the case that the force of my duties of friendship doesn’t depend on 
whether, when they purport to lay claim to my actions, I actually do count as 
caring for my friend, then these duties seem quite plausibly understood as 
providing me with categorical reasons for action and thus as being moral duties, 
at least on standard conceptions of morality according to which, as Raz (1989, 17) 																																																								
30 This notion of attitudinal care is admittedly a bit rough. But I don’t think that this is a problem 
here, for all that’s needed is the claim that caring for (or loving) another requires, at least in part, 
that one have the appropriate feelings for that other and emotional responses to whether things go 
well or badly for them. Of course, fleshing this out is a complicated task. Bennett Helm does just 
that in Helm 2010, particularly chapters 2, 3 and 5. 
31 In other words, our friendship makes appropriate my having certain feelings of care toward you 
and even commits me to having those feelings; absent some special justification, my failure to have 
those feelings is, to a certain extent, criticizable: I’m being a bad friend. For related discussion, see 
Ebels-Duggan 2008, 143 n4.  
32 Making such a failure public in a friendship needn’t require direct conversation but can instead 
be done by gradually drawing oneself away from the other—you two “drift apart”—in ways that 
aren’t failures to fulfill your commitments but still signal to the other the weakening or dissolution 
of the friendship. He may find, for instance, that you don’t spend as much time with him as you 
used to or that you are less interested in doing the things he enjoys, and he may rightly conclude 
that your relationship has changed or ended, even if you two never directly talk about it. What’s 
important here is that the fact that you no longer care for him as a friend cannot, by itself, dissolve 
your friendship; rather, dissolution requires that you communicate that fact to him.  
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puts it, “morality encompasses all categorical reasons” or, if not all, at least those 
categorical reasons governing one’s interactions with others.  
3. FRIENDSHIP AND MORAL DISAGREEMENT 
The disagreement Clara and Rosa face in Friend’s Audition is a disagreement 
confined to their friendship about whether Clara needs Rosa’s help rehearsing 
her lines. My claim has been that Rosa, if she is to care for Clara as an agent, 
must defer to her judgment about whether to help her. And, again, this duty to 
defer—as well as the larger requirement to care for the other as an agent, of 
which this duty is a part—is not just a requirement of friendship but also a moral 
requirement, one that internally structures friendship. And so, were Rosa to 
refuse to defer to Clara, her refusal wouldn’t be only a failure of friendship but 
also a moral failure.  
What, then, about a situation of moral disagreement between friends, one 
that is not confined to the friendship? Could a friend have a duty to defer to the 
other’s moral judgment? Consider the following situation, very loosely adapted 
from one in the film Death in Brunswick (Ruane 1990),33 involving two close 
friends, Carl and Dave, who must decide whether to hide a body:  
The Circumstances of Brunswick: Carl works as a cook at a small-town 
nightclub. One evening his kitchen helper Mustapha is severely beaten in 
the alley by some local toughs, and Mustapha is told that Carl was 
responsible for it (he wasn’t). Later that night, after closing, Mustapha 
goes after Carl in anger but, in doing so, impales himself on the large fork 
Carl is holding and dies. Soon after, Carl’s close friend Dave arrives to 
pick him up from work. They now face an urgent decision: “What are we 
to do?” 
There are two options: (a) call the police and wait for them to arrive so 
that Carl may give them his account of what happened, or (b) hide 
Mustapha’s body that night in a grave at the isolated cemetery where 
Dave works, ensuring that Mustapha’s death won’t be discovered.34  
What counts in favor of (a) and against (b)?  
As they both know, Mustapha was a devoted husband and father. His 
wife and son deserve to know what happened to him. Were they to 
hide Mustapha’s body, his wife and son will likely suffer substantial 
harms: the distress of not knowing where Mustapha is or even if he is 
alive; the worry that perhaps he abandoned them and, if so, that he 
really didn’t love them the way they’d thought; the inability to mourn 
Mustapha and carry out proper burial rituals; and the inability of 																																																								
33 Cited in Cocking and Kennett 2000, 279. I have borrowed certain of the descriptions of the case 
from Cocking and Kennett, though, to be fair, my version of the case departs radically from theirs 
(and so also from the situation presented in the film). 
34 They cannot simply flee the nightclub, leaving Mustapha’s body to be found the next morning, 
for doing so will not only ensure that Carl will be convicted of murder when he is eventually 
arrested and tried but will also likely put Dave in legal jeopardy as an accomplice. 
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Mustapha’s wife to begin in earnest building a life without him for 
herself and her son.  
What counts in favor of (b) and against (a)? 
As they both know, the local police are quite corrupt, often working 
with the drug gang that employs the toughs who beat up Mustapha. 
They are certain to ignore Carl’s account in order to close the case 
without implicating the toughs (and so the gang). Thus, Carl is quite 
likely to be convicted of a crime he did not commit. Furthermore, as 
they both know, the prison system is severely underfunded and rife 
with violence. Carl is slightly built, and he suffers from chronic diabetes 
and a heart condition. Were they to call the police, Carl will likely suffer 
substantial harms in prison: the routinized arbitrary violence meted out 
by guards; rape and other forms of sexual violence at the hands of other 
inmates; and deteriorating health and even early death because of a lack 
of proper treatment from the prison’s woefully inadequate medical 
facilities. 
Whichever option they choose, Dave’s help is required. For option (a), 
Dave must give Carl his cell phone if Carl is to call the police, as Carl 
doesn’t have one—he cannot afford one—and the nightclub’s phone is 
out of order. For option (b), Dave must not only help Carl move the body, 
but he also must unlock the cemetery and locate the grave that is to be 
filled in the next morning.35 
The end at stake, which Dave shares with Carl, is to keep Carl from going to jail 
for a crime he didn’t commit. Let us suppose that, after deliberating together, 
Carl and Dave disagree about how to pursue that end. Of course, there are 
several ways they could disagree, but I wish to focus on two:  
Brunswick 1:  Carl thinks that hiding Mustapha’s body is morally 
permissible and so he judges that (b), hiding the body, is the right 
decision, while Dave thinks that doing so forbidden and so he judges (a), 
calling the police, to be the right decision.  
Brunswick 2: Carl thinks that hiding Mustapha’s body is morally 
forbidden and so he judges that (a), calling the police, is the right 
decision, while Dave thinks that doing so permissible and so he judges 
(b), hiding the body, to be the right decision. 
In each case of disagreement, one friend thinks it is impermissible to pursue their 
shared end of keeping Carl out of prison in the way that the other proposes.36 																																																								
35 For another case of hiding a body in a cemetery, one that proves quite successful until one of the 
persons involved confesses to the police, see series 2 of Broadchurch (Chibnall 2015). For a case of 
hiding a body, one in which hiding the body seems quite clearly morally permissible (and perhaps 
even morally required), see series 2 of Luther (Cross 2011). For a more morally ambiguous case of 
hiding a body—the killing is arguably justified, but the friends’ fear of wrongful imprisonment 
may not be a reasonable fear—see season 2 of Friday Night Lights (Berg 2007). 
36 The judgment that hiding Mustapha’s body is impermissible does not amount to abandoning the 
end of keeping Carl out of prison, as the path from the nightclub to prison will be a winding one, 
and, even if they notify the police and Carl is arrested, there will likely be other, admittedly much 
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And, in each, Dave, as Carl’s friend, confronts the following: “What am I to do 
here? Should I help Carl act on his judgment? Or should I try to act on mine?” 
The aim of this essay is to show that a good friend sometimes has a moral 
duty to defer to his friend’s (mistaken) moral judgment, even when doing so 
requires helping him hide a body. And so, Brunswick 1 might seem the case on 
which to focus. However, the claim about Brunswick 1 that Dave, despite his 
moral worries, should help Carl hide the body is open to another, competing 
explanation, one provided by the “moral danger” account: acting properly as a 
friend, that is, acting out of a concern for your friend’s good for your friend’s 
sake, can sometimes require acting against morality; and Brunswick 1 is one such 
case, as Dave does the appropriate thing by acting as his friendship with Carl 
calls for, and thus hiding the body, rather than acting as morality requires, and 
thus calling the police.37  
Fortunately, the claim, about Brunswick 2, that Dave ought to help Carl call 
the police also requires explanation, since offering such help seems precisely not 
to be acting out of a concern for Carl’s good. We must explain why it is that 
proper care for a friend sometimes requires, as it does here in Brunswick 2, 
helping him act against his own good, even when one reasonably judges that 
such action is not morally required. As I argue, the correct explanation is that 
Dave has a duty to defer to Carl in Brunswick 2, since doing so is the way for 
Dave, as his friend, to care for him as a responsible moral agent. And, once we 
have that explanation available for Brunswick 2, it also becomes available for 
Brunswick 1, thus giving us a way to claim that Dave rightly helps Carl hide 
Mustapha’s body without that claim requiring us to admit that, in Brunswick 1, 
the demands of friendship override the demands of morality; and this will be so 
even on the assumption that Carl’s judgment—hiding Mustapha’s body is 
permissible—is, in fact, mistaken. Thus, the argument begins with Brunswick 2. 
3.1 Why Must a Good Friend Help You Call the Police? 
Because of the circumstances of Brunswick, Carl and Dave face a hard moral 
decision: there are genuinely weighty moral considerations on both sides—
considerations for and against either option—and it is, I think, quite difficult to 
determine what morality says about the case. Mustapha’s wife and son are 
innocents, but so is Carl. The harms Carl will likely suffer by going to prison for 
a crime he didn’t commit are arguably more severe than those Mustapha’s wife 
and son will likely suffer were Carl and Dave to hide Mustapha’s body; but, then 
again, the course of the police investigation and trial may provide other 
opportunities for Carl to avoid prison, and, even if the chances are slight, that 
there may be such opportunities is morally relevant. Thus, it is not only a 
question of comparing possible harms (and the number of sufferers) but also a 																																																																																																																																																							
less promising, opportunities to pursue this end. The judgment is rather that even though the end 
is certainly a permissible one, it is impermissible to pursue it by hiding Mustapha’s body. 
37 Dean Cocking and Jeanette Kennett (2000) offer a sustained defense of this “moral danger” 
explanation. 
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question of weighing the odds of those harms; and the result seems to be a 
genuinely hard moral case. (And I say this as someone sympathetic to the 
thought that the prohibition against hiding a body has the status of a side 
constraint, because even side constraints give way at times.) Granted, not every 
reader will agree that this is a hard moral case. But, for those readers, I expect 
that there will be some realistic detail(s) that, when added to the circumstances of 
Brunswick, will transform it into such a case; if you are such a reader, I ask that 
you add those details. 
 Why does it matter that Brunswick is a hard moral case? By admitting that it 
is such a case, we must also admit that Dave and Carl may each deliberate 
responsibly about what to do, making no deliberative mistakes, and yet arrive at 
conflicting moral judgments. Put as a slogan, hard moral cases give rise to 
reasonable moral disagreement. Now, this claim is not a terribly controversial 
one, since it is widely accepted that any conception of moral deliberation that 
guarantees correctness of judgment will be fit only for an idealized moral agent 
who, because they lack the limitations that humans inevitably face, is not a 
human agent.38 Any plausible conception of moral deliberation for human agents 
must admit the real possibility of moral disagreements that cannot be explained 
by pointing to deliberative mistakes on either side.39  
When it comes to understanding what goes into caring for a friend as a 
responsible agent, however, the full significance of this claim—that hard cases 
give rise to reasonable disagreement—has gone unappreciated. As I noted 
earlier, a friend shares the other’s ends, and this sharing involves, at times, acting 
with them in pursuit of those ends. But now, with this claim about reasonable 
disagreement, acting with them in a way compatible with caring for them as an 
agent (including as a moral agent) becomes a more complicated question, since 
the following sort of situation is possible:  
Though the friend disagrees with the other’s judgment about what to 
do—he thinks it’s morally mistaken—he recognizes that her judgment 
was the result of responsible deliberation: her deliberations properly 
appreciated the moral features of the situation, of what made the case a 
hard one, and that her deliberations do this is all that he (or anyone else) 
may legitimately expect of her as a human agent taking proper 
responsibility for her actions. Despite their disagreement, he recognizes 
that her deliberations have passed the test of responsible moral agency in 
a situation that has particular significance for one of her valuable ends.  																																																								
38 John Rawls (2001, 35-37), in a different context, calls these inevitable limitations “the burdens of 
judgment,” which are “the many obstacles to the correct (and conscientious) exercise of our powers 
of reason and judgment in the ordinary course of political life.” Rawls’s emphasis is often on the 
consequences of these burdens for our judgments of the good; but, as Jeremy Waldron (1999, 153) 
argues, there seems no reason not to take these burdens to have similar consequences for our 
judgments about justice and morality. For related discussion, see Charles Larmore’s (1996, 152-74) 
treatment of reasonable disagreement and pluralism. 
39 And so, we are concerned here not with, for instance, R. M. Hare’s “archangel” but rather with 
what Barbara Herman calls “a morally literate agent.” See Hare 1981, 44-64 and Herman 2000, 31-
33. 
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Let’s assume that Dave faces just this situation in Brunswick 2: Carl’s judgment 
that they must call the police passes the test of responsible moral agency, but 
Dave reasonably disagrees with it.40 Why ought Dave help Carl call the police? 
The first thing to note is that, because they reasonably disagree about this hard 
case, there is nothing more they can do as human deliberators to get closer to the 
answer about what morality demands.41 As a result, they now face a new 
deliberative situation, one of reasonable disagreement about what judgment to 
make in the former situation, and so a new question about what to do. And this 
new question is itself a moral question that cannot be answered simply by saying 
that they should do whatever morality demands in the former situation. Both 
Carl’s and Dave’s judgments about the former situation are reasonable, and so, 
even though they conflict—and would have importantly different consequences 
both for Carl and for Mustapha’s wife and son—each still counts as motivated by 
proper moral concern both for Mustapha’s wife and son and for Carl.  
In Brunswick 2, then, the problem concerns what Carl and Dave should do in 
this new situation of reasonable disagreement, and the answer depends on the 
nature of their relationship. Were they strangers, all that each would need to do 
is acknowledge the other’s reasonable view, and acknowledge it as reasonable, 
before acting on their own (reasonable) judgments.42 But, since Carl and Dave are 
close friends, Dave must care for Carl as an agent. Given that this situation has 
particular significance for Carl, it would be seriously disrespectful for Dave to 
insist on making the decision in Brunswick 2—and so for him to insist that they 
hide Mustapha’s body—because were he to do so, he would be taking 
responsibility for the decision away from Carl even though Carl’s judgment 
passes the test of responsible moral agency. Were he to do it out of concern for 
Carl, he would be acting paternalistically—“It’s better for you if I decide what we 
do”—and so in a way incompatible with friendship as a relationship of equals. 
Were he to do it out of a concern for himself and his own integrity—“I must do 
what I think is right here”—he would be holding himself separate from Carl in a 
way incompatible with friendship. And this is true even though he’d be seeing to 
it that Carl doesn’t go to prison, for what Dave would be revealing is that he is 
unable to share Carl’s end in a way that still allows it to be Carl’s; he can only 																																																								
40 Why think that either judgment can be reasonable? That Carl’s judgment can be seems easy to 
establish, for we’d just need to make sure his judgment is not driven by a lack of self-respect that 
leads him not to count his own life and interests as morally on a par with others’. That Dave’s 
judgment can be reasonable seems harder to establish, since one might think that, as Carl’s friend, 
Dave is bound to be overly partial, wrongly minimizing the harms to Mustapha’s wife and son. But 
suppose that Dave, like many, has a tendency toward rule-fetishism. In that case, were Carl not his 
friend, his commitment to the rule that hiding a body is forbidden would cause him to wrongly 
minimize the harms to Carl of calling the police. This tendency would thus lead him to fail to see 
that this is a hard case. But, since they are friends, these harms to Carl will be salient to him: he will 
perceive them as important moral features of the situation. In this sort of case, then, Carl’s status as 
his friend will be what rescues his deliberations from a common kind of moral blindness.  
41 This is partly because, in the circumstances of Brunswick, matters are rather urgent and so they 
cannot delay a decision in the hope that new evidence will emerge to tip the scales decisively in 
one direction or the other. I thank an anonymous reviewer for prompting me to make this explicit. 
42 Acknowledging that the other person’s view is reasonable—admitting that you see how the other 
could responsibly disagree—is an important sign of respect for the other’s judgment, particularly 
in the case of disagreement between strangers. 
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share it in a way that appropriates it as his own. Either way, denying Carl the 
chance here to take responsibility for the situation by responsibly exercising his 
moral agency is incompatible with caring for Carl as an agent.  
Thus, the fact that Dave and Carl are good friends in Brunswick 2 is morally 
salient. But, again, we must be clear about its precise relevance. It should not 
enter their deliberations about the morality of moving Mustapha’s body or 
calling the police. Rather, it is a salient feature of the later deliberative situation 
that Dave faces, the situation of reasonable disagreement between him and Carl 
about whether or not to hide Mustapha’s body, and it is so because of Dave’s 
duty of care toward Carl. As Carl’s friend, Dave must show proper care for Carl 
by giving his needs and interests special importance in his deliberations, 
including Carl’s interest in responsibly exercising his moral agency. And this 
interest is especially important here: the initial situation (and the moral problem 
it poses) is especially significant for Carl’s end of avoiding life imprisonment for 
a crime he did not commit. Because this initial situation is not particularly 
significant for Dave and his ends (except, of course, for his end of being a good 
friend to Carl), Dave’s interest in doing what he reasonably thinks right does not 
compete with Carl’s. Thus, both PAI and RJ are satisfied here and in Carl’s favor. 
Dave must defer to Carl here because doing so expresses not only the depth of 
his care for Carl but also the character of that care, as care for Carl as a 
responsible agent with sovereignty over his own life. 
If this account of Brunswick 2 is correct, one result is that a person’s interest 
in exercising agency extends even to moral questions and, in particular, those 
moral questions that admit of reasonable disagreement. When a person acts on 
their own reasonable moral judgments in difficult situations whose resolution 
will significantly shape their life, what happens—both the actions and their 
consequences—expresses their own moral sensibility and so counts as part of the 
moral world that they have created; the person thus takes responsibility for and 
invites others to hold them responsible for what happens, thereby demanding 
recognition both as a moral agent and as a reasonable one.43 In this way, they 
have reason to value the responsible exercise of their moral agency, particularly 
in situations that are significant for them, and their friends have reason to 
accommodate and promote this exercise. 
3.2 When Does a Good Friend Help You Move a Body? 
Notice that, as PAI has it, whether Dave has a duty to defer to Carl in 
Brunswick 2 depends on the extent to which the situation they face is significant 
for Dave. If, for instance, Dave’s presence were likely to cause the police to think 
him an accomplice to murder, Dave would not have a duty to defer to Carl’s 
																																																								
43 The claim here is similar to Raz’s account of self-respect, in which he says, for instance, that “the 
self-respecting person holds that others should treat [her] as someone who is capable of rational 
responsible agency” (Raz 1989, 15).  
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judgment that they should call the police.44 Because going to jail would 
significantly alter Dave’s life, he and Carl would each have reason to insist on 
responsibly exercising their own moral agency in Brunswick 2; Dave, then, 
would be justified in acting on his own reasonable judgment that it is permissible 
to hide Mustapha’s body. It would be appropriate for Carl to feel disappointed 
by Dave’s decision, since he would be unable to rely on the friendship in the way 
that he thought appropriate, but not betrayed, since Dave’s decision to act on his 
own judgment would not count as a failure to care properly for Carl. 
On the account I’ve offered, so long as both conditions—PAI and RJ—are 
satisfied in Carl’s favor, Dave has a duty to defer to Carl’s judgment. Dave’s 
duty, then, does not depend on Carl’s making the particular reasonable 
judgment he does. And so, let us now consider Brunswick 1: 
Brunswick 1:  Carl thinks that hiding Mustapha’s body is morally 
permissible and so he judges that (b), the hiding body, is the right 
decision, while Dave thinks that doing so is forbidden and so he judges 
(a), calling the police, to be the right decision.  
Carl’s and Dave’s judgments are switched: Carl thinks that hiding Mustapha’s 
body is permissible, while Dave thinks that doing so forbidden. Assuming that 
Carl’s judgment here is reasonable, my account claims that Dave has a duty as 
Carl’s friend to defer to him.45 Furthermore, it claims that, since deferring to Carl 
is required if Dave’s care for Carl is to be care for him as an agent, Dave doesn’t 
merely do what loyal friendship requires when he defers to Carl; he also does the 
morally justified thing, even if Carl’s judgment about the permissibility of hiding 
Mustapha’s body is, in fact, mistaken. Here, then, is the kind of situation where, 
despite his own moral worries, a good friend will (rightly) help you move a 
body. 
Of course, this duty to defer to a friend’s reasonable moral judgments—even 
about the permissibility of moving a body—obtains only when the relationship is 
already characterized by the appropriate relations of mutual care and mutual 
trust. Dave must give Carl’s interest in exercising moral agency this special 
importance in his deliberations only because Carl regularly gives Dave’s interest 
in exercising moral agency, along with his other interests, the same special 
importance. There is, however, an extra condition on the duty to defer when it 
concerns moral questions, and it is clearest when considering a case such as 																																																								
44 There is an added difficulty here, however: the more risk there is to Dave, the less Carl’s view 
that they ought to call the police is reasonable, for Carl’s deliberations must be informed by care for 
Dave. 
45 Why think that either judgment here can be reasonable? Consider Dave’s judgment. Dave is in a 
very good position to appreciate the harms that Carl will suffer if they call the police, but that he 
nevertheless thinks that doing so is required suggests that he also appreciates the harms 
Mustapha’s wife and child will suffer if they hide the body. That Carl’s judgment can be reasonable 
might seem harder to justify. But suppose that Carl, like many, has a tendency toward rule-
fetishism, one which would normally lead him wrongly to minimize the harms resulting from a 
decision to abide by the rule that hiding a body is forbidden; here, then, the fact that the harms will 
befall him is actually what makes them salient to him as important moral features of the situation 
and so leads him to see that this is in fact a hard case. 
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Brunswick 1: Dave must be justified in trusting not only that Carl cares for him—
and so is motivated in his choices by this care—but also that Carl is committed to 
acting morally—and so is motivated in his choices by this commitment. Without 
this latter sort of justified trust, Dave lacks sufficient reason to think that, by 
deferring to Carl, he is actually respecting and promoting Carl’s interest in 
responsibly exercising moral agency. And it is only if Dave is respecting and 
promoting this interest by deferring that his deference would be justifiable, say, 
to Mustapha’s wife, because it is only then that his deference counts as the action 
of a good friend and responsible moral agent.46 
If we assume, as seems plausible, that Carl’s judgment about hiding 
Mustapha’s body (though reasonable) is mistaken, it might seem that my claim 
here is that Dave is morally required to commit a grave moral wrong. But this 
way of putting it fails to distinguish between the two deliberative situations. In 
the circumstances of Brunswick, Dave, as Carl’s close friend, must do what Carl 
reasonably thinks ought to be done. Dave does act on his own judgment when he 
helps Carl, but that judgment is the one he makes in the later situation created by 
their reasonable disagreement. And, if we suppose his judgment there is 
correct—Carl’s judgment that they should hide the body is a reasonable one—
Dave does not commit a grave moral wrong in acting on it, even though his 
judgment is that he ought to defer to Carl’s (mistaken) judgment about the initial 
situation.47 Granted, the account does let Dave off the moral hook, so to speak.48 
But what gets Dave off the hook—he is Carl’s close friend—also puts Carl doubly 
on the moral hook: he is responsible not only for the decision to hide Mustapha’s 
body but also for making use of Dave’s friendship in the way he does. 
3.3 A Good Friend Will Help You Move a Body: Two Objections 
Before concluding the argument, we need to consider two objections. Both 
challenge the claim that, because Dave’s duty to defer doesn’t depend on Carl 
making the particular reasonable judgment he does, Brunswick 1 and Brunswick 
2 are thus symmetrical.  																																																								
46 Why should Mustapha’s wife recognize that Dave had a duty to defer to Carl? She is someone 
who is engaged in relationships of love and so she sees herself as having special responsibilities 
toward those she loves. As Niko Kolodny (2003, 153) notes, to love someone is, in part, to recognize 
that anyone in the same sort of relationship will have the same special responsibilities toward their 
beloved as one has to one’s own. And so, as someone who has (or once had or is capable of having) 
a close friend, Mustapha’s wife must admit that all close friends, including Carl and Dave, have 
duties of friendship toward each other. 
47 I thank Nishi Shah for discussion on this point. 
48 Dave is off the hook here only because he makes the correct judgment about deferring to Carl. 
But this decision is itself a hard one, for it depends on judging whether Carl’s judgment is 
reasonable. And so, Dave is still on the moral hook in an important way: his decision about 
whether he ought to defer to Carl or not is a significant moral decision for which he is responsible. 
And this is itself a morally risky decision to make, particularly if Sarah Stroud’s (2006, 499) claim 
that “friendship involves not just affective or motivational partiality but epistemic partiality” is 
correct, for then Dave’s friendship with Carl might make him prone to misjudging Carl’s 
judgments as reasonable. For Stroud’s defense of this claim, see Stroud 2006. 
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The first objection is directed at the claim that, even if Carl’s judgment in 
Brunswick 1 is mistaken, Dave does the morally justified thing by helping Carl. 
How can it be morally justified, one might wonder, for someone to help a friend 
hide a body when doing so may in fact be a serious moral wrong? If it cannot be, 
then perhaps Brunswick 1 is a limiting case for the duty to defer: while Dave 
may have a duty to defer to Carl’s (reasonable) judgment in Brunswick 2, he does 
not in Brunswick 1 because of the greater moral risk Carl runs in Brunswick 1, if 
hiding the body is not in fact permissible, than he runs in Brunswick 2, if calling 
the police is not in fact required. The thought here is that, when faced with two 
reasonable but conflicting moral judgments, one should help a friend act on the 
judgment that, were it mistaken, it would be morally better for him to have acted 
upon than it would be for him to have acted on the other, were that one 
mistaken. And, in this case, it is morally worse to act on the mistaken judgment 
that one may permissibly choose that innocent others will suffer serious harms 
than it is to act on the mistaken judgment that one must suffer serious harms 
instead.49  
The problem with this objection is that, even if it is correct about the 
differences in moral risks one runs in acting on either judgment, these 
considerations are ones that Carl and Dave are to include in their initial 
deliberations about what to do, since responsible moral deliberation requires 
seriously considering the possibility that one might be mistaken. In other words, 
if Carl’s judgment that it is permissible to hide Mustapha’s body is reasonable, 
then his deliberations will have already canvassed these considerations about 
moral risks, and so these considerations don’t provide a way for Dave to resolve 
his question of what he is to do, given that he and Carl reasonably disagree about 
whether to call the police or hide Mustapha’s body.50  
The second objection concerns the fact that, in Brunswick 2, Carl’s judgment 
is that he is the one to suffer harm, while, in Brunswick 1, his judgment is that 
Mustapha’s wife and child are the ones to suffer harm. According to this 
objection, this difference between the cases matters for the question of deference 
that Dave faces because, while the former judgment is a morally admirable one 
for Carl to make—he is, in a way, martyring himself for the sake of innocent 
others—the latter is not—he is acting in a morally cowardly way, shifting the 
harm from himself onto innocent others—and Dave, as Carl’s friend, should only 
help him carry out the judgment that, even though he disagrees with it, is a 
morally admirable one for Carl to make. It is important to note, about this 
objection, that my account is vulnerable to it only if it admits that Carl’s 
judgment in Brunswick 1—hiding Mustapha’s body is permissible—can be (and, 
for the sake of argument, is) a reasonable one, since otherwise my account is not 
committed to the conclusion, which the objection targets, that Dave ought to 
defer to Carl. The objection’s claim, then, is that, even supposing that Carl’s 																																																								
49 The objection here is a two-person version of a view about what an individual should do in the 
face of moral (or normative) uncertainty that Andrew Sepielli has considered in his recent work. 
See, for instance, Sepielli 2009 and 2014. I thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing Sepielli’s 
work to my attention. 
50 I thank Lee Franklin for discussion of this objection. 
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judgment in Brunswick 1 is reasonable, what Carl does in making that 
judgment—he decides that they should hide Mustapha’s body—shifts the harm 
at issue on to others in a morally cowardly way, and Dave, as Carl’s friend, 
ought not help Carl act in such a way. 
This objection does not succeed either. In Brunswick 1, Carl’s judgment that it 
is permissible to hide Mustapha’s body is reasonable (we are supposing), and 
that it is shows that he is committed, as a responsible moral agent must be, to 
pursuing his ends in only morally permissible ways. Now, as this objection 
notes, what is permissible may still not be morally admirable but rather morally 
cowardly; here, even if it is permissible to hide Mustapha’s body, it would 
nevertheless be morally better (because morally admirable) for Carl to call the 
police. The problem with the objection, however, is that, unlike the commitment 
to pursuing his ends in only morally permissible ways, the commitment to acting 
in morally admirable ways (and not in morally cowardly ways) will be only one 
among several of Carl’s valuable ends. Part of what a responsible agent with 
sovereignty over their own life does is manage the often competing claims of 
their various ends on their choices and actions: they must decide which ends to 
pursue, which to postpone, which to forsake; they must decide how important 
some end(s) is (are) relative to some other competing one(s); they must decide 
what they are willing to do (and unwilling to do) in the pursuit of some end(s). 
In Brunswick 1, Carl has decided that he is not willing to spend his life in prison 
for a crime that he did not commit—thereby forsaking all of his ends that require 
freedom and participation in society—so that he might do the morally admirable 
thing. If Dave is to care for Carl as a responsible agent, he must recognize that 
this is Carl’s decision to make, since it is not just a decision to be a moral coward 
but also a decision to pursue whatever valuable ends—going to college, pursuing 
a career, starting a family, traveling the world—he has judged worth the cost of 
that cowardice.  
4. CONCLUSION 
This account of the duty to defer provides a way of affirming, for certain 
situations, the insight about close friendship contained in the joke, “A friend will 
help you move house, but a good friend will help you move a body,” without 
thereby being forced into the view that friendship has an inherent tendency to 
lead one into moral danger. In situations like Brunswick, there is often an 
important conflict—between realizing the duties of loyal friendship and doing 
what one otherwise takes to be morally correct—but this sort of conflict might 
nevertheless be internal to morality. My aim has been to develop an account of 
how this conflict might indeed be internal to morality: because morality requires 
that one’s care for a friend be care for them as an agent, one will sometimes have 
a duty to defer to them, even about moral questions.  
And so, one difficulty with close friendship is that, by becoming friends with 
another, a person assumes some risk that their friend will call on them for help 
and, in doing so, place them in a situation in which they face a distinctive kind of 
hard moral decision—“Do I defer to my friend’s moral judgment, one I think 
	 27 
mistaken? Or do I act on my own?”—one for which they are responsible. However, 
if we are to hold that, because of the great good that this kind of friendship realizes 
for persons, it is permissible for persons to form such friendships, we are 
committed to holding that this is a morally permissible risk for them to take. 
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